American banks 美国银行Payback time还债赎身
Apr 16th 2009 200年4月16日From The Economist print edition 摘自《经济学人》印刷版
Goldman Sachs and other banks want to pay back bail-out cash. But the banking system is not in the clear yet
高盛投资公司及其它一些银行希望偿还政府救济资金。但银行业并非已脱离困境。
USING taxpayers’ funds to prop up America’s banking system was a necessary evil. So in many ways it is welcome that some banks now want to repay the money. On April 14th, six months after getting $10 billion from the Treasury, Goldman Sachs sold $5 billion of new shares with that in mind.
用纳税人的钱来支持美国的银行业本就是一件迫不得已的事。因此从许多方面来说，现在一些银行希望偿还这些钱是受欢迎的。在四月十四号，即从财政部获取一百亿救济金六个月之后，高盛投资公司抛售了价值五十亿的新股用于还债。
It is easy to see why. Some banks, including Goldman, say that back in October they had enough capital and took part in the bail-out only to show solidarity with the government’s plan. Since then they have been excoriated by Congress and now face restrictions, mainly on pay but also on hiring foreigners, that Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman’s boss, says “limit our ability to compete”. Meanwhile banks’ shares have soared on optimism about their profits. Goldman says that repayment is a “duty”. But who wants to rely on livid voters and banker-bashing politicians when private cash is available?
其中缘由显而易见。一些银行（包括高盛）称，早在十月份他们就有充足的资金而参加政府救助计划只是为了声援政府救市方案。自那以后他们就一直受到国会非难而如今还要面临诸多限制。这些限制除薪酬问题外还包括聘用外籍员工方面。正如高盛老板劳埃德.布兰克费恩说，“那将限制我们的竞争力 ”.同时银行的股票已出现上涨，他们对利润收益颇为乐观。高盛称还债是“义务”。想想，当有私人资金可以利用时谁还想依靠满脸愠色的选民和欺压银行的政客？
The principles for letting a bank repay bail-out cash are clear. Its capital position must remain strong: capable of at least maintaining its lending book, absorbing shocks, and commanding enough confidence to allow borrowing without state guarantees. It should repay taxpayers by selling new shares or retaining profits. For a bank to boost capital by withdrawing credit or exiting important business lines would be counterproductive. It must have healthy profits and sane risk and pay policies. European banks, such as HSBC, that have got there without state support have rightly been applauded.
能让一家银行有能力偿还救济资金的条件很明显。那便是它的资本状况务必尚需雄厚：至少有能力维持放贷、缓解冲击及有足够的信心无需国家担保获得借款。银行务必通过出售新股或保住盈利来偿还纳税人的钱。而如果银行靠降低信誉或取消重要业务来募集资金的话只会适得其反。银行务必要有相当的利润及健全的风险和薪资政策。欧洲银行，如汇丰银行，就没向国家寻求支持而被连连称赞。
Does Goldman pass these tests too? Although it has just reported bumper earnings (see article), their quality was mixed, and relied too much on volatile trading. It has a slug of hard-to-value assets and its borrowing costs have yet to return to normal; it is still using the government’s debt-guarantee scheme. But its regulatory capital ratios are solid, half as strong again as those of America’s ten biggest banks overall. When the Treasury completes its stress tests to evaluate the largest banks soon, Goldman should pass with flying colors.
高盛能经得起这些考验吗？虽然据最新报道高盛获得了不错收益（见全文）,但这些收益的质量参差不齐，过多依赖于不稳定交易。高盛拥有小部分难估价资产并且它的借款费用又回到了原样；高盛仍沿用政府的债务担保方案。但是它的法定资本比率高，相当于美国前十大银行总体比率的二分之一。一等财政部完成对十大银行评估的压力测试，高盛将胜利通过。
No bank is an island 没有哪家银行能独善其身
Yet the crisis has shown that banks do not exist in isolation. Some say that by letting lenders repay the state, those unable to do so would face runs on their shares and junior debt. This cannot be made the sole consideration—the banking system should not walk at the pace of its weakest members. However there is still a danger that the American banking system as a whole is nearly insolvent. And if the stress tests are rigorous, they could show that insolvency is indeed some banks’ likely fate: losses may well eat up much of the system’s capital.
这次金融危机让人们看到银行不是孤立存在的。有人说如果让银行返还政府救济金，那些没能力偿还的银行将得拿它们的股票和顺应债务去冒险。但不可孤立地看问题-——银行业不能被这个行业的弱者拖了后腿。然而，作为一个整体而言，美国银行业仍有破产的危险。如果压力测试严格的话，破产的确是某些银行的可能面临的命运：破产损失将吞掉银行业好些资金。
The slim margin for error means confidence could still evaporate, with even good banks dragged down by counterparty risk. The government says banks that fail the stress tests must raise capital within six months (from the state if necessary) and sell toxic assets. The tests must not be fudged. Providing that the six-month deadline is a firm one, forcing Goldman and others to retain their unwanted funds till then seems fair. But that is long enough. Meanwhile, the politicians should stop changing the rules about pay and bonuses.
细微的误差率也可能意味着信心的消失，因为即使实力雄厚的银行都可能被交易对手风险拖垮。政府称，如果银行未能通过压力测试，将必须在6个月内筹集资金（有必要的话通过国家筹集）和出售不良资产。测试不得掺假。如果6个月期限确定的话，要求高盛及其他银行保留其空闲资金至那时看起来似乎公平。但是，六个月的时间够长了。与此同时，政界人士应停止对工资和奖金规定变来变去。
The dollar as a reserve currency 以美元作为储备货币Handle with care小心应对Mar 26th 2009
China suggests an end to the dollar era中国建议结束美元时代
IN FUTURE, changes to the international financial system are likely to be shaped by Beijing as well as Washington. That is the message of an article by Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China. Mr Zhou calls for a radical reform of the international monetary system in which the dollar would be replaced as the main reserve currency by a global currency. It is a delicate issue, however. When Tim Geithner, America’s treasury secretary, discussed the proposal in New York on March 25th, his remarks sent the dollar tumbling before he made clear that, naturally, he thought the greenback should remain the dominant reserve currency.
在将来，就像美国一样，中国很可能会促进国际金融体系的变革。这是中国人民银行行长周小川发布的一篇文章所隐含的信息。周先生要求彻底改革国际货币体系，由一种全球性的货币来取代美元成为主要储备货币。当然，这是一个很棘手的问题。当美国财政部部长蒂姆.盖特纳于3月25日在纽约讨论这项提议时，他的讲话引发了美元比价的波动，他很快就澄清，认为美元仍然是占主导地位的储备货币。
Mr Zhou’s proposal is China’s way of making clear that it is worried that the Fed’s response to the crisis—printing loads of money—will hurt the dollar and hence the value of China’s huge foreign reserves, of which around two-thirds are in dollars.
周先生的建议清楚地以中国方式表明担忧，美联储为应对危机而大量印制美元将损及美元的价值，进而影响到中国巨额的外汇储备的价值，这其中近三分之二为美元储备。
He suggests that the international financial system, which is based on a single currency (he does not actually cite the dollar), has two main flaws. First, the reserve-currency status of the dollar helped to create global imbalances. Surplus countries have little choice but to place most of their spare funds in the reserve currency since it is used to settle trade and has the most liquid bond market. But this allowed America’s borrowing binge and housing bubble to persist for longer than it otherwise would have. Second, the country that issues the reserve currency faces a trade-off between domestic and international stability. Massive money-printing by the Fed to support the economy makes sense from a national perspective, but it may harm the dollar’s value.
周先生认为基于单一货币（他实际上并没有提及美元）的国际金融体系，有两个主要缺陷。第一，作为储备货币地位的美元促成了全球经济的不平衡性。贸易顺差国家别无选择，只有将大量备用资金投入到储备货币中，用来稳定贸易和拥有最佳流动性的债券市场。但是，这种做法相对其他方式所导致美国更无节制的借贷和持续时间更长的房地产泡沫。第二，储备货币的发行国面临权衡国内和国际的稳定性的抉择。从国际角度来说，美国联邦政府大规模印制美元来支持经济发展无可厚非，但这种做法很可能会损害到美元的价值。
Mr Zhou suggests that the dollar’s reserve status should be transferred to the SDR (Special Drawing Rights), a synthetic currency created by the IMF, whose value is determined as a weighted average of the dollar, euro, yen and pound. The SDR was created in 1969, during the Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate system, because of concerns that there was insufficient liquidity to support global economic activity. It was originally intended as a reserve currency, but is now mainly used in the accounts for the IMF’s transactions with member countries. SDRs are allocated to IMF members on the basis of their contribution to the fund.
周先生认为，美元的储备地位应移交给由国际货币基金组织所创立的特别提款权，其价值是取决于美元、欧元、日元和英镑的加权平均值。在1969年，因为担心没有足够的流动资金来支持全球经济活动，在制定布雷顿森林固定汇率制度时设立了特别提款权。设立特别提款权初衷是用来作为储备货币的，但现在主要用于国际货币基金组织成员国间的贸易结算。特别提款权对国际货币基金组织成员的配额是以成员国对国际货币基金组织的贡献为基础的。
Mr Zhou’s plan could win support from other emerging economies with large reserves. However, it is unlikely to get off the ground in the near future. It would take years for the SDR to be widely accepted as a means of exchange and a store of value. The total amount of SDRs outstanding is equivalent to only $32 billion, or less than 2% of China’s foreign-exchange reserves, compared with $11 trillion of American Treasury bonds.
周先生的计划可能赢得来自其他拥有巨额外汇储备的新兴经济体的支持。然而，中国也不可能在很短的时间就能取得很大的成效。这将需要几年的时间让特别提款权以一种交易和保值的方式被广泛接受。相比于十一万亿美元的美国国债，特别提款权未缴总额仅相当于三百二十亿美元，还不足中国的外汇储备的百分之二。
There are also big political hurdles. America would resist, because losing its reserve-currency status would raise the cost of financing its budget and current-account deficits. Even Beijing might want to rethink the idea. Mr Zhou praised John Maynard Keynes’s proposal in the 1940s for an international currency, the “Bancor”, based on commodities. But as Mark Williams of Capital Economics says, central to Keynes’s idea was that a tax be imposed on countries running large current-account surpluses, to encourage them to boost domestic demand.
该项提议同时也面临巨大的政治障碍。由于失去储备货币的地位将会提高融资预算成本和导致经常帐户赤字，美国将会抵制这项提议。就连中方可能也要重新考虑这一想法。周先生称赞凯恩斯在二十世纪四十年代所提倡的基于商品定值的国际性货币“ Bancor ”的建议。但资本经济学家马克.威廉姆斯说，凯恩斯的建议的实质是，对那些拥有经常账户巨大盈余的国家征税，来鼓励他们扩大内需。 附加解释：Bancor： 上世纪四十年代凯恩斯就曾提出采用30种有代表性的商品作为定值基础建立国际货币单位“Bancor”的设想
Economic indicator经济指标Googling the future Google一下未来
Internet search data may be useful for forecasters
网络搜索数据也许可以帮助经济预测专家
CLAIMS of clairvoyance, particularly when they come from economists, deserve a sceptical reception. Hal Varian, a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley who also happens to be Google’s chief economist, has no such pretensions, but he does believe that data on internet searches can help predict certain kinds of economic statistics before they become available.
人们具有预见能力的这一说，尤其是经济学家的预见能力通常都会引起质疑。加州大学伯克利分校的经济学教授，谷歌公司首席经济学家Hal Varian表示，他没有如此的洞察力和预见力，但他相信在某些经济统计数据公布之前，网络搜索的数据能够帮助预测这些数据。
In a new paper written with Hyunyoung Choi, a colleague at Google, he argues that fluctuations in the frequency with which people search for certain words or phrases online can improve the accuracy of the econometric models used to predict, for example, retail-sales figures or house sales. Actual numbers for such things are usually available only with a lag. But Google’s search data are updated every day, so they can in theory capture shifts in consumer behaviour before official numbers are released.
Varian和谷歌的另一名同事Hyunyoung Choi最新发表了一篇论文，他表示对于人们在网上搜索的一些字词短语，其频率的变化可以提高经济计量模型预测零售销售或售房数据的准确性。这些确切销售数据通常是要滞后一段时间才能得到。但是谷歌搜索数据每天都在更新，因此理论上在官方数字出炉之前，们就把握住了消费者行为的变化。
These data are available through a site called Google Trends, which allows anyone who cares to do so to download an index of the aggregate volume of searches for particular terms or categories. Mr Varian and Mr Choi show that the addition of these search trends to econometric models improves the accuracy of their estimates.
人们可以在一个名叫谷歌趋势的网站上得到这些数据，并且可以下载特定条款或物品被搜索总量的指数。Varian和Choi表示，共同利用这些搜索趋势和经济计量模型就能够提高预测的准确性。
For example, using data on searches for trucks and SUVs to predict the monthly sales of motor vehicles reduces the average error by up to 18% compared with the predictions from a model that did not incorporate the search data. The volume of searches for Hong Kong carried out in countries like America, Britain, Australia and India also seems to predict eventual tourist arrivals to the territory from these countries rather well.
比如，与不用搜索数据的模型得出的预测相比，利用货车和SUV的搜索数据来预测汽车月销售量会减少高达18%的平均误差。在美国，英国，澳大利亚和印度等国进行的对香港的搜索似乎也能预测从这些国家到香港旅行的游客人数。
How widely could this idea be applied? For some things, like retail sales, the categories into which Google classifies its search-trend data correspond closely to what people may want to predict, such as the sales of a particular brand of car (see chart). For others, like sales of houses, things are less clear. It appears that searches for estate agents work better than those for home financing. But anything that makes the crystal ball less cloudy is welcome.
这一方法的应用有多广？对于一些事物，比如零售销售，某些种类（谷歌将搜索趋势数据划分到该种类）和人们期望预测的事物非常相关，比如某一种汽车品牌的销售。对于其它的项目，如房屋销售，情况就比较模糊。但对房地产经纪人的搜索似乎比对房屋抵押贷款机构的搜索更能清楚地说明房屋销售问题。无论如何，，只要能使这个水晶球更加透明清晰，任何方法都是受人欢迎的。
Japanese banks A capital affair 日本银行的资本事件 Apr 8th 2009 | TOKYO
The investments of Japanese banks in other firms create a vicious circle
日本银行投资于其它公司成了一个怪圈。
IN A country where social relations are paramount, Japanese banks are so loyal to their customers that they hold shares in them. That loyalty has been tested for almost 20 years whenever the stockmarket lurches lower. But still the banks cling on to their shares, carrying around ￥10 trillion-worth ($100 billion) on their books.
日本是一个社交至上的国家，日本银行如此忠心于其客户，以至持有他们的股权。这份忠诚已经历了20多年来股市每每受挫时的考验。而银行依然保持参股姿态，在其收支平衡表上大约值10万亿日圆（1000万美元）。
The trouble is, the further the market falls, the more banks have to write down the asset values on their balance-sheets, which increases their losses. It also shrinks the tier-one capital that they hold as a cushion against further losses, constraining their ability to lend.
麻烦的是，市场越下滑，银行资产负债表上资产的价值就越缩水，为此损失越多。一级资本亦会缩减，一级资本被用作对付进一步亏损的缓冲，同时放贷能力受限。
The country’s three “megabanks”—Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), Mizuho and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG)—are particularly vulnerable. Their shareholdings as a percentage of tier-one capital range from just below 50% to above 60% (see chart). The trio are expected to post losses this year.
日本三大“超级银行”——三菱日联金融集团（Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group）、瑞穗金融集团（Mizuho Financial Group）和三井住友金融集团（Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group）——尤为岌岌可危。他们所持股权占一级资本的百分比由50%以下变动至60%以上（见表）。预计三大行今年将亏损。
But in Japan, even the titans find it hard to break with tradition, especially one that dates back to the Meiji era in the late 1800s when Japan began to industrialise. Capital was scarce and banks felt they had a role to support national industry; taking a stake in a borrower showed that their fates were united. Moreover, most banks were linked to companies within corporate families, called zaibatsu. That smoothed trade within and outside the groups.
但在日本，即使是伟人也难于打破传统，尤其是在19世纪末日本开始工业化的明治时代。资本匮乏，且银行认为它们有责任支撑本国的工业；参股借贷企业表示他们一损俱损，一荣俱荣。此外，大多数银行都与家族集团联系在一起，称之为财阀。这样做使集团内外的交易顺利进行。
After the second world war, huge conglomerates were forbidden and replaced by the keiretsu, a network of individual companies working together. Cross-shareholdings remained routine.
二战后，大型企业集团被禁，转而由企业联盟替代，这是一个私营公司合作网。交叉持股依然是惯例。
For most of the postwar period, the arrangement was highly lucrative. As share prices soared, balance-sheets swelled. This in turn pushed share prices higher. But after the bubble burst in 1990, it took a decade for regulators to begin forcing banks to reduce their shareholdings. In 2002 the government capped the ratio of equities to tier-one capital at 100%, which marked the beginning of the reduction (with the state itself as a buyer). Now, as then, requiring banks to dump their shareholdings altogether—however laudable—would run the risk of turning a bear market into a rout.
战后的大多时间里，此举带来了高额利润。随着股价高涨，资产负债表跟着膨胀。这转而推动股价进一步走高。但在1990年股市泡沫破灭后，日本监管层耗时十年开始强制银行减少其所持股权。2002年日本政府规定了所持股本最高上限，即为一级资本数额，此举标志着缩减股权的开始（国家作为买主）。目前同那时一样，要求银行抛售他们手中的股权——虽值得赞誉——却存在着使本就颓废的市场垮掉的风险。
Although today shareholdings remain huge compared with bank capital, the ratio is a third of the 150% of a decade ago. And although Japanese banks own 5% of the value of the country’s stockmarket, this too is far below the 20% they owned in 1985. So however troubling the problems remain, the banks can at least point to improvement.
虽然当前所持股权相较于银行资本而言依然是庞大的，但比率却是十年前的三分之一，当时比率为（一级资本的）150%。而且尽管日本银行占有该国股市市值的5%，但这相较于其1985年所占20%的比例真是小巫见大巫。因此虽然麻烦问题仍在，银行却至少能励精图治。
Japanese banks must deduct a percentage of certain unrealised losses from their shareholdings from their tier-one capital. According to UBS, every 10% drop in the Nikkei 225 Stock Average requires banks to raise from ￥13 billion to ￥190 billion apiece to replenish their tier-one ratios to around 7.5%. That would still be below 8%, the level considered safe in the current climate.
日本银行必须要从其所持股权和一级资本中扣除一定比例的未变现亏损。据瑞银集团（UBS），日经225指数每下滑10%，银行就需要增加130亿至1900亿日圆补充其一级资本，使其比率维持在7.5%左右。该比率仍低于当前环境下8%的安全度。
Raising funds is painful. In February Mizuho said it would issue ￥80 billion in preferred securities to rebuild its capital, but pay an annual fixed coupon of almost 15%—a cost it almost certainly cannot cover from its earnings. More recently it declined to redeem a $1.5 billion security at the first possible date, underscoring its need to preserve capital.
增加资本金着实困难。瑞穗金融集团在2月份表示，该集团将发行800亿日圆的优先债券修复其资本，但所支付的固定票息超过15%，收益几乎不够支付成本。最近该集团拒绝在最初的可能到期日赎回价值150亿美元的债券，强调其需要保有资本。
In recent weeks, the government has offered to inject capital into the banks and has set aside ￥20 trillion to buy many of the wilting shares from them. That would enable the banks to strengthen their balance-sheets further, preserve capital and keep on lending. But most banks have resisted: relying on the state would suggest they are in trouble. And selling would require them to crystallise the losses rather than let hope—that one day the stockmarket may miraculously recover—spring eternal. In the season of cherry blossoms, hope is all they have.
近几周来，日本政府已提出向银行业注资，并留有20万亿日圆购买银行手中持有的许多贬值股票。此举可使银行资本负债表进一步充盈、保有资本及继续放贷。但多数银行却拒绝了，认为依赖政府会表明他们陷于困境。而出售手中的股权将要求他们具体化其亏损度，而非使希望——某天股市会奇迹般反弹——永存。在这个樱花盛开的季节，他们所拥有的只有希望而已。
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